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2CONTINUOUS-TIME EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS:
THEORY AND PRACTICE
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A B S T R A C T
This paper surveys some recent developments in the literature which studies
continuous-time evolutionary dynamics in the context of economic modeling.
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31. EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS AND EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
Since Adam Smith (1776) introduced the notion of natural price as ì...the
central price, to which the prices of all commodities are continually
gravitating...î it is difficult to think of an idea more extensively applied in
economics than the idea of an equilibrium. Yet, it is even more difficult to name
another concept about which interpretation has been more controversial.
Compare, for example, the alternative equilibrium notions proposed by Walras
(1874), Cournot (1838), Marshall (1916), Keynes (1936), Arrow and Debreu
(1954), Hahn (1973), Lucas (1972) and Cass and Shell (1983). In other words,
despite its pervasive use in economic modeling, many questions concerning the
foundational aspects of equilibrium analysis remain. Questions that are too
serious to be dismissed as mere academic puzzles. Market fluctuations and
imperfections are endemic in real-life economics. From the unemployment
equilibria of Keynesian memory to the various real business cycle and
disequilibrium theories proposed in later literature, the focus on equilibrium
analysis has been continuously challenged on various grounds and from
different perspectives.
Clearly, game theory cannot avoid considering the foundational aspects of
equilibrium analysis, since it is an equilibrium concept, namely Nash
equilibrium, which has made its fortune. In this respect, we follow Binmore
(1987-8) in distinguishing between two alternative justifications of equilibrium
analysis which have been maintained by game-theoretic tradition:
ï an eductive justification, which relies on the agentsí ability to reach
equilibrium through careful reasoning. Since agents are fully rational, they
can always correctly predict (and optimally respond to) their opponentsí
behavior;
ï an evolutive justification, which relies on the possibility that boundedly
rational agents reach equilibrium by means of some adjustment process.
4The aim of this paper is to survey this latter methodological approach. In
particular, we focus on those papers that follow the evolutive justification using
evolutionary dynamics to describe how imperfectly rational players adjust their
behavior in reaction to a changing environment. In other words, this evolutive
approach tries to answer the (supposedly simple) question:
how do people learn to play?
We shall break this grand question into smaller pieces. By doing so, we will
introduce the main assumptions on which the evolutionary paradigm followed
by this literature is based.
ï Where do we learn? The environment in which agents operate is modeled by
an infinitely repeated game. Moreover, the set of feasible behaviors
coincides with the strategy set of the stage game. In this respect,
evolutionary games differ from other strategic frameworks like differential
games (in which the current payoff is a function of time) or supergames (in
which strategies are defined over time-paths). Clearly, any justification for
such a drastic assumption, apart from mathematical tractability, contains
serious weaknesses. It is almost impossible to consider two situations as
being absolutely identical,1 or in which future consequences are completely
neglected. However, when interaction is anonymous (i.e. it takes place
among a large population of agents who have no prior knowledge of the
identity, the history, or any other relevant characteristics of their opponents)
this framework appears to be more justifiable. This is why the literature has
focused almost entirely on this case.
ï What do we learn (from)? We follow Selten (1991) in distinguishing three
classes of learning models.
(i) Rote (individual) learning models, in which success and failure directly
influence choice probabilities.
                                          
1Models of learning in which games are similar are those of Li Calzi (1995) and Romaldo
(1995).
5(ii) Imitation (social) learning models, in which success and failure of others
directly influence choice probabilities.
(iii) Belief learning models, in which experience has only a direct effect on
playersí beliefs.
This survey deals with models of the first two categories, in which players
need not know (or care) much about the game they play, other than the payoff
they (or other agents in the population) obtain.2
ï How does memory affect learning? A distinguishing feature of this
literature is that agents have no memory. All the quantitative features of the
adjustment process are completely characterized by the current state of the
system.3
In their standard form, evolutionary models are based on the assumption that
agentsí behavior is genetically encoded in the genes which characterize each
agentís type. The evolution of a population of competing types is subject to
natural selection, which links game payoffs (ìfitnessî) to growth rates of each
type in the population. This evolutionary paradigm has a long tradition in the
history of economic thought, from the seminal contributions of Marshall (1916)
and Schumpeter (1936) to the work of Nelson and Winter (1982) and their
followers. However, despite their intuitive appeal, the interest on evolutionary
dynamics has been mostly confined to specialists. There are at least three
reasons for this state of affairs:
                                          
2See Battigalli et al. (1992) and Fudenberg and Levine (1998) for comprehensive surveys on
belief learning models.
3Some might regard this assumption also as unreasonable. Look at the case in which the
dynamics exhibit limit cycles, as in Ponti (forthcoming). This would imply that agents are not
able to recognize the cycle and modify their response accordingly. As Fudenberg and Levine
(1998: p. 3) argue: ìwe suspect that if cycles persisted long enough the agent would eventually
use more sophisticated inference rules that detected them; for this reason we are not
convinced that models of cycles in learning are useful descriptions of actual behavior...î .
6_  lack of microfoundation, that is, a formal link between this biological
metaphor and explicit models of social interaction;4
_ lack of generality, because the formal analysis is often restricted to very
specific dynamics (namely, the so-called Replicator Dynamics);
_ lack of convergence results, that is, lack of characterization of the
asymptotic properties of the adjustment process. This, essentially, translates into
lack of predictive power.
The potential of evolutionary dynamics outside the narrow bounds of
specialistic interest lies in the extent to which these theoretical gaps are being
filled. The aim of this survey is to acknowledge a more general audience of
some new theoretical results on these matters which, in our opinion, improve
our understanding on the working of evolutionary dynamics and substantially
enlarge the feasible fields of applications of evolutionary techniques.5
The remainder of this survey is arranged as follows. In section 2 we choose
the notation and set up the relation between dynamics and game payoffs. In
section 3 we review the literature which derives some evolutionary dynamics
starting from explicit models of social interaction. Section 4 deals with
convergence results, considering more general adjustment processes (namely,
monotonic dynamics) than the classic Replicator Dynamics. Finally, section 5
explores the recent literature on evolutionary dynamics with drift. This approach
allows more flexibility in describing the dynamics by introducing arbitrarily
small perturbations. In consequence, we can study evolutionary models in terms
of their structural stability properties.
                                          
4 This is how Bˆrgers (1996) describes the difficulties in applying pure evolutionary
techniques to study social evolution. First, it is not practically feasible, given the state-of-the
art knowledge in genetics, to derive predictions of human behavior by appealing to its genetic
determination. Moreover, the way in which genes affect behavior appears to be very
complicated. Finally, the adaptation of human genes occurs too slowly to derive predictions of
some interest for the social scientist.
5A clear signal of this renewed interest is the growing literature which reviews the state-of-
the-art of the discipline. Among others, see Fudenberg and Levine (1998), Samuelson (1997),
Vega-Redondo, (1996) and Weibull (1995,1997).
72. CONTINUOUS-TIME EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS
Let Γ ≡ ℑ,Si ,ui{ } be a normal form game, where ℑ ≡{1,... ,I} is the finite set of
players with generic element i ; S i ≡{1,... ,K i} is the finite set of player i ís pure
strategies with generic elements h and k; ui :S →ℜ  is player iís (VNM) payoff
function, with S ≡ ×i∈ℑSi  denoting the set of pure strategy profiles with generic
element s. Thus, the set of player iís mixed strategies is the Ki −1 -dimensional
unit simplex ∆ i ≡{σ i ∈ℜ+
K i : σ i
k
=1
k∈Si
∑ }, with ∆ ≡ ×
i∈ℑ
∆ i  (∆−i ≡ × j≠ i∆ j ) denoting the set
of mixed strategy profiles (of i’s opponents). Generic elements of ∆
−
i  and ∆  are
denoted by σ
− i  and σ ≡ σ i ,σ
−
i( ) respectively. Finally, let ∆0  (∆−i0 ) be the relative
interior of ∆ (∆
−i ), that is, the set of completely mixed strategy profiles (of i’s
opponents).
Player iís behavior is described by the mixed strategy she adopts at each point
in time, ri(t)∈∆ i, with r(t) ≡ ri (t)( ) denoting the vector collecting such
probabilities.
ASSUMPTION 1. For any given r 0( ) ∈∆ , r(t)  evolves according to the following
system of continuous-time differential equations:
Ý r i
k (t) = fi
k r(t)( ) . (2.1)
We refer to the autonomous system (2.1) as the selection dynamics, i. e. the
term that captures the relevant forces governing the playersí strategy revision.
Taylor and Jonker (1978) propose two alternative interpretations for the
dynamics (2.1).
ï There is a single agent for each playerís position i . At each time t, player i
randomly selects a pure strategy k ∈Si  using a probability distribution,
ri(t)∈∆ i. This probability distribution evolves according to (2.1) as a result
of some (unmodeled) learning adjustment process.
8ï There are I populations of agents, one for each playerís position i. Each agent
is genetically programmed to play a pure strategy k ∈Si . An (unmodeled)
natural selection process adjusts the relative frequencies of each type in each
population according to (2.1).
The latter interpretation follows more closely the biological metaphor on
which these dynamics have been originally proposed, whilst the former
considers these adjustment processes as mimicking some form of individual
learning. Both these interpretations will be formally derived in section 3.6
DEFINITION 1. The function f ≡ fi( ) is said to yield a regular dynamic if the
following conditions are satisfied:
i) fi
k:∆→ ℜ  is Lipschitz continuous7 for all i and k;
ii) fi
k(σ) =
k∈Si
∑ 0  for all and i and σ ;
iii) lim
σ i
k → 0
fi
k σ( )
σ i
k  exists for all i and k.
These regularity assumptions imply that growth rates γ i
k σ( )≡ fi
k σ( )
σ i
k  are
continuous on ∆0  and that the system (2.1) has a unique solution ρ(r(0),t )
through any initial state r 0( ) which leaves ∆ , as well as ∆0 , invariant. In other
words, all trajectories starting from ∆  (∆0 ) do not leave ∆  (∆0 ). This can be
interpreted as a ìno creation/no extinctionî property. A pure strategy which is
played with positive probability at time zero will also be played in any finite
time. On the other hand, if a strategy is not played at time zero, it will never be
used.
                                          
6One of the aims of Taylor and Jonker (1978) was indeed to establish a formal link between
the equilibrium concept of Evolutionary Stable Strategy (Maynard Smith and Price (1973) and
some evolutionary dynamics which did converge to it. Cressman (1992) provides an excellent
survey of this research field.
7Sometimes (e. g., in Cressman (1997)) the condition of Lipschitz continuity is replaced by
the stronger requirement of continuous differentiability. In this case the dynamics are defined
as smooth regular.
9To complete the description of the dynamics we also need to establish a
formal link between the selection process and the game payoffs. We do so by
introducing the Replicator Dynamics (RD hereafter), that is, a regular dynamic
(2.1) where, ∀k ∈Si ,∀σ ∈∆ ,
fi
k (σ ) = σ i
k u i k,σ−i( )− ui σ i ,σ −i( )( ). (2.2)
For the RD success breeds success, since only strategies which pay off ìmore
than averageî have a positive growth rate.8 Nachbarís (1990) monotonicity
condition should be interpreted in the same spirit.
DEFINITION 2. A function f is said to yield a monotonic dynamic (MD) if
∀h,k ∈Si ,∀σ ∈∆ ,
u i (h ,σ
−
i ) ≤ u i (k ,σ
−
i ) ⇔ γ i
h (σ) ≤ γ i
k (σ)  . (2.3)
Condition (2.3) generalizes an appealing property of the RD. For any given
pair of pure strategies, the relative frequency of the more successful grows at a
higher rate. Samuelson and Zhang (1992) extend the condition of monotonicity
to mixed strategies introducing the notion of aggregate monotonicity.
DEFINITION 3. A function f is said to yield an aggregate monotonic
dynamic(AMD) if, ∀σ i , ′ σ i ∈∆i ,∀σ
*
∈∆ ,
ui(σ i ,σ−i
* ) ≤ ui( ′ σ i ,σ −i
* )⇔ γ i
k (σ *)σ i
k
k∈S i
∑ ≤ γ ik (σ *)
k∈S i
∑ ′ σ i k  . (2.4)
According to (2.4), if σ i  yields a lower expected payoff than ′ σ i against σ− i
* ,
then the vector f σ*( ) should point ìmoreî in the direction of ′ σ i than σ i .
                                          
8This dynamic was first introduced by Taylor and Jonker (1978). While equation (2.2) refers
to the multi-population case (i.e. assigns one set of differential equations to each player
position), Taylor and Jonker (1978) deal with the single-population case only. The multi-
population RD was first introduced by Taylor (1979). See also Cressman (1992) for a multi-
population model in which agents can play mixed strategies.
10
It follows from the above definitions that RD ⊂ AMD ⊂MD .9 Some useful
properties of MD are listed in the following
                                          
9See Weibull (1995), chapter 5.
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PROPOSITION 1. Suppose that f  satisfies condition (2.3) and consider the
associated MD (2.1).10
i)  If σ ∈∆  is stable,11 then σ  is a Nash equilibrium of Γ .
ii) If σ ∈∆  is the limit for some interior solution, then σ  is a Nash equilibrium
of Γ .
PROOF. See Weibull (1995), Theorem 5.2 (b,c).
3. ECONOMIC MICROFOUNDATION
There are two basic ìstoriesî which have been proposed to justify the use of
evolutionary dynamics in the context of economic learning. Not surprisingly,
each story follows closely one of Taylor and Jonkerís (1978) interpretations
mentioned earlier in this paper. We shall look at each story more in detail in the
remainder of this section.
3.1. THE ÌINDIVIDUAL LEARNINGÎ STORY: LEARNING BY REINFORCEMENT
To present this first class of models, we use as a reference the paper by
Bˆrgers and Sarin (1997). In their model, agents use mixed strategies. A very
                                          
10As it turns out, Proposition 1 holds for a larger class of evolutionary dynamics than MD,
namely weakly payoff positive dynamics. The condition of weak payoff positivity requires that
at least one pure strategy which yields a payoff above average (provided that such a strategy
exists) has a positive growth rate. We restrict our attention to MD, since the results surveyed
in this paper refer to this class.
11Loosely speaking, a state σ  is called (Lyapunov) stable if trajectories starting arbitrarily
close stay sufficiently close. If σ  is also attracting, i.e. is the limit point for all trajectories
which start sufficiently close, then σ  satisfies the stronger condition of asymptotic stability.
For more formal definitions, see Weibull (1995).
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simple rule links the current payoff with the mixed strategy which will be
used in the subsequent round. In particular, pure strategies which perform well
against the opponentsí actions are reinforced, and the probability with which
they are selected grows accordingly.
In contrast with a typical evolutionary biological model, here alternative
strategies compete in the agentsí minds as populations of ideas. As Bˆrgers and
Sarin (1997: p. 3) observe: ìDecision makers are usually not completely
committed to just one set of ideas, or just one way of behaving. Rather, several
systems of ideas, or several possible ways of behaving are present in their mind
simultaneously. Which of these predominate, and which are given less attention,
depends on the experiences of the individual...î. This approach is not new, as it
follows the tradition of Estesí (1950) ìstimulus sampling theoryî of behavioral
psychology, subsequently formalized by Bush and Mostellerís (1951,1955)
stochastic learning theory, and by the theory of ìadaptive economic behaviorî
proposed by Cross (1973, 1983).12
In describing Bˆrgers and Sarinís results on the relationship between the
stochastic process they analyze and the deterministic dynamics studied in this
paper, we modify slightly their assumptions to allow a higher degree of
generality. Anna and Beppe are two individuals playing an infinitely repeated
game. At each point in discrete time n ∈(0,1,2,...), each player selects an action
using a probability distribution, ri(n) . It is assumed that, at each round,
Anna/Beppe knows only about the action s/he plays and the payoff s/he obtains.
Suppose that, at round n, Anna has played her pure strategy k ∈SA  and Beppe
has played his pure strategy k* ∈SB . Under these circumstances, Anna will
update her mixed strategy as follows:
rA
k (n +1) = vA (k ,k
*),r(n)( )+ 1 − v A (k,k *),r(n)( )( )rAk (n) ,
(3.1)
                                          
12Papers on reinforcement learning are also those by Bendor et al. (1991), Bˆrgers and Sarin
(forthcoming), Sarin (1995) and the experimental studies conducted by Roth and Erev (1995),
Mookherjee and Sopher (1997) and Erev and Roth (1998).
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rA
h (n +1) = 1 − v A (k,k
* ), r(n)( )( )rAh(n)  for all h ≠ k , (3.2)
with v i :S × ∆→ (0,1) satisfying v i(s,σ) = α i(σ ) + βi(σ)ui(s), where α i:∆→ ℜ  and
βi :∆→ ℜ+  are Lipschitz continuous functions.13 In words: the change in
probability ∆rA
k (n) ≡ rA
k (n +1) − rA
k (n)( ) is proportional to a given increasing linear
transformation of the payoff Anna received in the stage game, with coefficients
which may depend on the state variable r(n), up to a rescaling that constrains
rA (n +1) to be in the unit simplex.14
Denote by E ∆rA
k r[ ] the expected value of ∆rAk (n), given that the state at time n
is r(n) = r . From (3.1-2) we derive the following :
E ∆rAk r[ ]= E vA (k, k* ),r( )r[ ]+ 1 − E vA (k, k* ),r( )r[ ]( )rAk( )rAk + 1 − E vA (k, k* ),r( )r[ ]( )rAk( )rAh
h≠ k
∑
= E v A (k,k
*), r( )r[ ]1 − rAk( )rAk − rAk E vA (k, k* ),r( )r[ ]rAh
h≠ k
∑
= α A (r) +β A (r)uA (k ,rB )( )1 − rAk( )rAk − rAk αA (r) + βA (r)uA (k,rB )( )rAh
h≠ k
∑
= rA
kβA (r) uA (k ,rB ) − uA (r)( ),
(3.3)
which implies
PROPOSITION 2. For each player i ∈ℑ, the expected motion of the discrete-time
dynamics (3.1-2) is aggregate monotonic.15
                                          
13A similar expression holds for Beppe.
14Notice that the probability of the selected action at time n is always increasing, i.e.
∆rA
k
(n) ≡ v A (k, k
*
), r(n)( )1 − rAk (n)( )> 0. In other words, for the learning dynamic (3.1-2) every
experience is positively reinforced. Also notice that v i  is a function of the state variable σ.
Following Bˆrgers et al. (1998), this accounts for environmental conditions that may affect the
individual learning process.
15Since the stochastic process is defined in discrete time, aggregate monotonicity is defined
substituting 
∆rik (n)
ri
k (n)
 for γ i
k  in (2.4).
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3.2. THE ÌCULTURAL EVOLUTIONÎ STORY: LEARNING BY IMITATION
We now move on to the literature which identifies cultural (or social)
evolution with the ability to observe and successfully imitate other agents.
These models follow the biological metaphor more closely, since they look at
the aggregate behavior of a population.
To present this alternative approach, we refer to Schlag (1998). Suppose
there are two large populations, one population of Annas and one population of
Beppes, playing an infinitely repeated game. Within each round, agents select
an action before they play against a randomly matched opponent. Between
rounds, each agent knows about the strategy and the payoff of another agent in
the same player position, randomly selected by symmetric sampling.16 Each
agent then updates her current strategy using a rule which maps from current
payoffs and actions of both sampling and sampled agent to the action which is
to be played by the sampling agent in the following round.
Schlag (1998) begins by proposing a class of updating rules that agents might
eventually select if required to choose a rule, once and for all, before entering
into the matching and sampling scenario. He defends this class of rules on the
basis of a set of axioms by which he characterizes bounded rationality. Such
rules exhibit the following properties:
ï they are imitative, in the sense that an agent never switches to an action that
has not been observed in the current period;
ï the probability of switching to an action which performed better is
proportional to the difference in payoffs between the action of the sampled
agent compared with the action currently used by the sampling agent.
 We refer to these rules as proportional imitation rules. Under these rules,
imitation occurs only if the realized payoff of the sampled agent was higher.
                                          
16By ìsymmetricî sampling the author means a matching scheme in which the probability
with which agent x samples agent y must be equal to the probability with which y samples x.
15
More formally, let X i ≡ maxh, k∈SA
h* ,k * ∈S B
ui(h, h
*
) − ui(k, k
*
)  be the maximal payoff difference
for player i. Assume that, at round n, an agent in Annaís position, after having
played strategy h ∈SA  against h
*
∈SB , samples an agent who has played k ∈SA
against k* ∈SB . Under these circumstances, the sampling agent will revise her
strategy from h  to k  with probability
˜ β A uA (k,k *) − uA (h,h* )( ) if uA (h,h* ) ≤ uA (k ,k *) , and
0 otherwise,
where ˜ β A ∈ 0, 1X A
 
   
 
    is a fixed constant.
Next step is to consider an environment in which agents of the same
population use the same proportional imitation rule and to look at the expected
motion of the frequencies with which the various actions are played. By analogy
with (3.3), we obtain
E ∆rA
k r[ ]= ˜ β A uA k, rB( )− u r( )( )rAk . (3.4)
This, in turn, implies
PROPOSITION 3. For each population i ∈ℑ, the expected motion of the discrete-
time dynamics (3.4) is aggregate monotonic.
As for the related literature on social evolution, Binmore and Samuelson
(1997) propose another model in which agents base their strategy revision on
imitation. However, their model has also some similarities with the ìindividual
learningî approach of section 3.1, since switching occurs only if the current
payoff is lower than the payoff received in the previous round. In other words,
the updating rule is based upon an endogenous aspiration level equal to the
16
previous round payoff.17 Under these assumptions, they show that the expected
motion of the frequencies with which each pure strategy is played follows the
RD. Bjˆrnerstedt and Weibull (1995) consider a model in which agents receive a
ìnoisyî signal on the realized payoffs of a sample of other agents in the
population. In this case, if the support of the noise is sufficiently large, then the
resulting dynamic is monotinic.18
3.3. EXPECTED MOTION VS. ASYMPTOTIC BEHAVIOR
We have just derived evolutionary dynamics as expected motions of two
alternative stochastic processes based on different models of social interaction.
As it turns out, for both models, the same evolutionary dynamics also
approximate the stochastic process as the time scale gets to its continuous limit,
since both stochastic processes converge in probability to the corresponding
(aggregate monotonic) deterministic dynamics. To show this, we shall focus on
Bˆrgers and Sarinís (1997) learning model, although a similar result can be
proved also for Schlagís (1998) imitation dynamics.19
To construct its continuous-time limit, we modify the system (3.1-2) as
follows: conditional of any realization (k ,k * ) at time n
rA
k
(n +1) = θv A (k,k
*
), r(n)( )+ 1 − θvA (k, k* ),r(n)( )( )rAk (n),
(3.1í)
rA
h (n +1) = 1 − θvA (k, k
* ),r(n)( )( )rAh (n), for all h ≠ k ,
(3.2í)
where θ ∈(0,1] measures the ìreal timeî interval between two repetitions of the
game. Let R θ (n) ∈∆  define the state of the system at time nθ  for a given initial
                                          
17Se also the related works on aspiration learning by Bjˆrnerstedt (1993), Banerjee and
Fudenberg (1995) and Ponti and Seymour (1997).
18See also Cabrales (forthcoming).
19See Schlag (1998), Theorem 3.
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condition R θ (0)∈∆ . Consider now the following system of differential
equations:
fi
k
(σ ) = βi(σ ) ui (sik ,σ
−
i) − ui (σ)( ) (3.5)
with βi  as in (3.1-2). Since βi  is Lipschitz continuous, the associated dynamic
(2.1) is AMD.20
To establish the relationship between the discrete-time stochastic dynamics
(3.1í-2í) and the continuous-time deterministic dynamics induced by (3.5), we
evaluate the continuous-time limit of R θ (n)  at some time t ≥ 0  for any sequence
of θs  and ns  with the property that θ → 0 and nθ → t . In other words, we take
limits keeping fixed the ratio between the rate at which players adjust their
mixed strategy and the rate at which the time interval shrinks.
PROPOSITION 4. Suppose R θ (0) = r(0) almost surely. Then, for all t ≥ 0 , R θ (n)
converges in probability to ρ(r(0), t) as θ → 0 and nθ → t , where ρ(⋅, ⋅)  is the
solution mapping of (3.5).
PROOF. See Bˆrgers and Sarin (1997), Proposition 1.21
Proposition 4 holds only for any finite time t ≥ 0 . This is to say that the
asymptotic properties may differ, depending on whether we consider the
stochastic process or its (either continuous or discrete time) deterministic
approximation. To clarify this point, consider the asymptotic behavior of
Bˆrgers and Sarinís (1997) learning dynamics in the case of zero-sum games.
                                          
20See Samuelson and Zhang (1992), Theorem 3.
21Although Bˆrgers and Sarinís (1997) proof refers to the RD only, its generalization to
AMD follows directly from Lipschitz continuity of βi .
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FIGURE A
Discrete-vs. continuous -time RD and zero -sum-games
Figure Aii) traces orbits of the continuous-time RD for the game of Figure
Ai). The dotted arrows of Figure Aii) represent the expected jumps of the
discrete time dynamics (3.1-2). As the diagram shows, the continuous time
process cycles around the (unique) equilibrium in mixed strategies, whereas the
discrete time (deterministic) dynamics does not converge, approaching the
boundaries of the state space. Moreover, we also know that the stochastic
process (3.1-2).will eventually settle down on one of the four pure strategy
profiles, which constitute the set of absorbing states.22 In consequence, even if
the discrete-time stochastic process is well approximated by the continuous-
time deterministic dynamics within any finite time interval, the asymptotic
properties of the two processes may significantly differ.
4. SOME CONVERGENCE RESULTS
This section reviews some recent results on the convergence properties of
dominance solvable games. We also frame this literature by introducing a new
19
concept (which we call τ -dominance) to help the reader understand how these
results have been established.
4.1. MD AND STRICTLY DOMINATED STRATEGIES
We begin by considering the evolutionary properties of strictly dominated
strategies. In this respect, it turns out to be crucial how the concept is formally
                                                                                                                               
22By (3.1-2) only pure strategy profiles are absorbing states and they are reachable in finite
time with positive probability from any interior state.
20
defined. Conventionally, we say that a pure strategy h ∈Si  is strictly
dominated if there exists another (pure or mixed) strategy σ i ∈∆ i which yields a
(strictly) higher payoff against all the opponentsí mixed strategy profiles:
 ui(h,σ
−
i
* ) < ui(σ i ,σ
−
i
* ),∀σ
−
i
*
∈∆
−
i . (4.1)
Otherwise, to consider strategy h  as strictly dominated, we might ask for the
stronger requirement of σ i ∈∆ i being a pure strategy itself. If strict dominance is
interpreted in this more restrictive sense, we then know that, for all MD, not
only strategies which are strictly dominated,23 but also strategies which do not
survive the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, will eventually
vanish.
PROPOSITION 5. Suppose that f  satisfies condition (2.3) and consider the
associated MD (2.1). If h ∈Si  does not survive the iterated deletion of pure
strategies strictly dominated by pure strategies, then lim
t→∞
ρi
h (r(0),t ) = 0  for all
r(0)∈∆0 .
PROOF. See Samuelson and Zhang (1992), Theorem 1.
Things are different if we consider strict dominance with respect to mixed
strategies. In this case, to obtain the same result as in Proposition 5 we then
need to impose some more stringent condition on the dynamic than
monotonicity alone.24 To clarify this point, we provide an example adapted from
Dekel and Scotchmer (1992).
                                          
23This result is due to Nachbar (1990).
24For example, Akin (1980) shows that strictly dominated pure strategies vanish along any
interior solution of the single-population RD. However, as noted by Akin and Hofbauer
(1982), this result does not hold for pure strategies in the support of a mixed strategy which is
strictly dominated by another mixed strategy.
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FIGURE B
An adaptation of Dekel and Scotchmerís (1992) counterexample
The game of Figure B differs from the game of Figure Ai) only by the fact
that Anna (the row player) has an additional strategy (M) which yields a payoff
of .4 to both players, regardless of what Beppe (the column player) does.
Strategy M is not strictly dominated by a pure strategy, although it is strictly
dominated by any mixed strategy sufficiently ìcloseî to the (unique Nash
equilibrium) strategy which attaches probability .5 to strategies T and B.
Figure Ci) traces some trajectories of the RD for the game of Figure B. The
trajectories of Figure Aii) are now limit cycles25 for those of Figure Ci), once the
strictly dominated strategy M has been eliminated. Figure Cii) shows
trajectories of an MD in which growth rates are as follows:
γ i
k (σ ) = ui k,σ− i( )− σ ih
h∈Si
∑ ui h ,σ−i( ) (4.2)
As the diagram shows, the face Φ ≡ x,y, z( )∈∆ y + z =1{ }is an attractor for some
interior trajectories (e.g. those of Figure Cii)) of the dynamics induced by (4.2).
In consequence, the strictly dominated strategy M fails to be eliminated.
                                          
25By limit cycle we mean a periodic solution of (2.1) which attracts some interior trajectory
starting sufficiently close to it. For a more formal definition, see Hofbauer and Sigmund
(1988).
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FIGURE C
MD and strictly dominated strategies
Hofbauer and Weibull (1996) show how this behavior is not specific of the
functional form (4.2). They consider a class of regular evolutionary dynamics
(which they call functional selection dynamics) in which growth rates are as
follows:
 γ i
k (σ ) = αi (σ) +β i(σ )ϕ ui k ,σ−i( )[ ], (4.3)
with α i and βi  as in (3.1-2), and ϕ  Lipschitz continuous. The asymptotic
behavior of strictly dominated strategies for functional selection dynamics (4.3)
is summarized in the following
PROPOSITION 6. Suppose that γ  satisfies condition (4.3) and consider the
associated functional selection dynamics (2.1). If h  does not survive the iterated
deletion of pure strategies strictly dominated by mixed strategies and ϕ  is
strictly increasing and convex then, for all r(0)∈∆0 , lim
t→∞
ρi
h (r(0), t) = 0 .
PROOF. See Hofbauer and Weibull (1996), Theorem 2.
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If the difference in growth rates is exactly proportional to the difference in
payoffs, then we have an AMD. In this respect, Proposition 6 generalizes an
earlier result of Samuelson and Zhang (1992), showing that aggregate
monotonicity is a sufficient condition for the extinction of strategies
(iteratively) strictly dominated by mixed strategies.
4.2. MD AND WEAKLY DOMINATED STRATEGIES
We now move on to weak dominance. We restrict our attention to the case of
pure strategies which are weakly dominated by other pure strategies, that is,
strategies h ∈Si  for which there exists another pure strategy k ∈Si  which never
yields a (strictly) lower payoff against all the opponentsí mixed strategy
profiles:
 ui(h,σ− i
* ) ≤ ui(k i ,σ− i
* ),∀σ
− i
*
∈∆
−i ,
with ui(h,σ− i
* ) < ui(k i ,σ− i
* ) for some σ
− i
*
∈∆
− i  and, a fortiori, ∀σ−i
*
∈∆
−i
0 .
Consider the extensive form game of perfect information of Figure D, known
in the literature as the Entry Game.26
FIGURE D
The Entry Game
In this game, Anna (the potential entrant) has to decide whether to challenge
Beppe (playing strategy D) under the threat that Beppe (the incumbent) may
fight back (playing d in return). This would lead to an inferior outcome for both
players. She also know that Beppeís threat to fight back is not credible, since
her action is observed by Beppe before he has to move and he has no incentive
to carry out the threat. The game of Figure D has a Nash (subgame-perfect)
equilibrium in pure strategies, namely (D,c), and a component (that is, a closed
                                          
26See Selten (1978).
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and connected set) of Nash equilibria with the common property that Anna
plays
25
C with probability 1 and Beppe plays his weakly dominated strategy d with
probability x ≥ 1 / 3. Let the symbol NE denote this component, which signals
the presence of alternative best replies to the equilibrium strategy C.27
Figure E traces some interior trajectories of the RD for the Entry Game.
FIGURE E
The RD and the Entry Game
As the diagrams show, there are interior trajectories leading to NE. In other
words, for some interior solutions, the playersí limiting behavior may fail to
eliminate weakly dominated strategies.
PROPOSITION 7. The subgame perfect-equilibrium D,c( )  is the unique
asymptotically stable restpoint for the RD. All Nash equilibria in the relative
interior of NE are stable and are the limit point of some interior trajectory.
PROOF. See Gale et al. (1995), Proposition 1. ð
This result, which contrasts standard game-theoretic analysis, seems
counterintuitive also from an evolutionary perspective. In fact, if initial
                                          
27A detailed account of the dynamic properties of games with alternative best replies is
26
conditions lie in ∆0 , as it is commonly assumed by the evolutionary literature,28
weakly dominated strategies will always yield strictly lower payoffs than those
strategies which dominate them, at least in any finite time. This is essentially
because the system will never reach in finite time one of the faces of ∆  in which
the dominant and the dominated strategy yield the same payoff.
As we know from Proposition 7, this is still not sufficient to ensure the
extinction of a weakly dominated strategy. However, if a weakly dominated
strategy does not vanish, then all the opponentsë pure strategies against which
the dominated strategy yields a lower payoff than the dominant strategy are
bound to get eliminated. This result, first proved by Nachbar (1990) in the case
of MD which converge to a Nash equilibrium, has been substantially
generalized in subsequent works.29 As it turns out, the same result can be
fruitfully applied to analyze the convergence properties of weakly dominance
solvable games, once its implications are suitably translated into an alternative
notion of dominance.
DEFINITION 4. Fix some regular dynamic (2.1). A pure strategy h ∈Si  is said to
be strictly τ -dominated by some pure strategy k ∈Si  (h <τ k  hereafter) if we can
identify a time τ  and a non-empty compact set C
−i ⊆ ∆− i such that
ρ
−i (r(0),t) ∈C− i ,∀r(0)∈∆
0 ,∀t > τ , (4.4)
ui(h,σ− i) < ui(k,σ− i) , ∀σ−i ∈C− i. (4.5)
Moreover, h is weakly τ -dominated by k (h ≤ τ k  hereafter), if (4.4) holds and
we replace (4.5) by the following conditions:
ui(h,σ− i) ≤ ui(k,σ− i) ,∀σ−i ∈C− i, (4.6)
ui(h,σ− i) < ui(k,σ− i) ,∀σ−i ∈C− i
0 , (4.7)
                                                                                                                               
provided by Samuelson (1994).
28This assumption is justified by the fact that a strategy that has zero weight at time zero
would also have zero weight at all subsequent times. Thus, if initial conditions were not
completely mixed, the dynamics would then operate on a different game.
29See Cressman (1996), Proposition 3.1 and Weibull (1995), Proposition 5.8.
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where C
−
i
0
≡ C
−
i ∩∆
−
i
0 .
Definition 4 establishes a weaker condition of dominance which is defined
only with reference to the dynamics under consideration.30 This definition is
based on the existence of a finite point in time, τ , after which (independently of
the initial conditions) the system is confined into a compact subspace in which
the usual conditions of dominance hold.
Some interesting properties of the asymptotic behavior of τ -dominated
strategies are contained in the following propositions.
PROPOSITION 8. Suppose that f  satisfies condition (2.3) and consider the
associated MD (2.1). If h <τ k  then, for all r(0)∈∆
0 ,
lim
t→∞
ρih (r(0), t)
ρi
k (r(0), t)
= lim
t→∞
ρi
h (r(0),t) = 0  .
PROOF. See Ponti (forthcoming), Proposition 4.2.ð
Let ω(r(0))  define the ω − limit set of ρ r(0), t( ); i.e.
ω(r(0)) ≡ σ ∈∆ρ(r(0), tm )→ σ for some sequence tm m =1
∞{ }.
PROPOSITION 9. Suppose that f  satisfies condition (2.3) and consider the
associated MD (2.1). If h ≤ τ k  then
i) lim
t→∞
ρih (r(0), t)
ρi
k (r(0), t)
≡ L i
h,k( ) (r(0)) ≥ 0 for all r(0)∈∆0 ;
ii )if L i
h,k( ) (r(0)) > 0 then ui(h,σ
−
i) = ui (k ,σ
−
i ), for all σ
−
i ∈ω
−
i(r(0));
iii) if j ≤τ h  then j ≤τ k .
PROOF. See Ponti (forthcoming), Proposition 4.1.ð
                                          
30If h  is strictly (weakly) dominated by k , then h  is also strictly (weakly) τ -dominated by
k . In this case, τ = 0  and C
−i = ∆ −i .
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By (4.8) the ratio 
ρih(r(0),t)
ρi
k(r(0),t)
 must converge, whether player i’s mixed strategy
converges or not. By (4.9), if 
ρih(r(0),t)
ρi
k
(r(0),t)
 converges to a positive constant, this
implies that both pure strategies h and k must yield the same payoff against all
mixed strategy profiles in ω
− i(r(0)). Finally, (4.10) ensures that the weak τ -
dominance relation is transitive, as is the ìclassicalî definition of dominance.
Proposition 9 better explains to which extent the intuition ìdomination
implies extinctionî holds and how this is related to the performance of strategies
h and k in the limit. In particular, the extinction of a weakly dominated strategy
h is guaranteed only if, in the limit, its relative performance is uniformly worse
(i.e. h is strictly τ -dominated).
We provide the reader with an application of Propositions 8-9 to prove
convergence in the case of the Entry Game
PROPOSITION 10. Suppose that f  satisfies condition (2.3) and consider the
associated MD (2.1) in the case of the game of Figure D. For all r(0)∈∆0 ,
ρ(r(0), t) converges to a Nash equilibrium.
PROOF. In the Appendix.
In the remainder of this section, we review some theoretical results which
apply similar techniques to study the convergence properties of other weakly
dominance solvable games.
FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERÍS DILEMMA. Cressman (1996) shows that, in
the finitely repeated Prisonerís Dilemma, all interior trajectories of the RD
converge to a Nash equilibrium, that is, an outcome equivalent to the unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium by which both players to defect at all stages.
TWO-PLAYER EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION WITH
DISTINCT PAYOFFS. Also for these games the use of backward-induction (or the
iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies) selects a unique subgame-
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perfect Nash equilibrium outcome. Cressman and Schlag (1998) restrict their
analysis to the RD and prove (among other properties) the following
THEOREM 1. every interior path converges to a Nash equilibrium.
THEOREM 2. For "simpleî games, (games of perfect information in which at
most three consecutive decisions are made), the Nash equilibrium component
which contains (i.e. is outcome-equivalent to) the backward induction solution
is the unique interior asymptotically stable set.
Theorem 1 identifies a class of games for which an equilibrium notion
(namely, Nash equilibrium) accurately describes the asymptotic play of a
particular evolutionary dynamic (namely, the RD). However, this result does not
support more stringent equilibrium requirements like, for example, subgame-
perfection. Non subgame-perfect Nash equilibria may be limit points of a non-
zero measure set of interior trajectories, as we already know from Proposition 7.
We also learn from Theorem 2 that the Nash equilibrium component NE of
Figure E cannot be asymptotically stable, although it is in the limit set of the
RD. Trajectories starting arbitrarily close to NE move away from it and never
come back, where the same phenomenon does not occur when we consider the
subgame-perfect equilibrium (D,c). Finally, asymptotic stability of the
backward induction solution is guaranteed by Theorem 2 only for games that
are simple in Cressman and Schlagís terminology. For more complex games
such an asymptotically stable set may even fail to exist.
MD AND THE CENTIPEDE GAME. The results we just reviewed have been
proved for the RD only . However, in his evolutionary analysis of the Centipede
Game (a game of perfect information with distinct payoffs) Ponti (forthcoming)
shows how Propositions 8-9 can be used to generalize all the results above to
MD. As we noticed in the introduction, this generalization allows more
flexibility in the use of continuous-time dynamics outside the field of
evolutionary biology, where the specific form of the RD is used to mimic a
stylized reproductive process.
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5. EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS WITH DRIFT
This section deals with some recent papers that employ continuous-time
dynamics to approximate perturbed adjustment processes. Here the
evolutionary dynamics (2.1) are slightly modified to account for the
imperfections that may interfere with the selection process.
This methodology has been prompted by the vast literature on discrete-time
stochastic processes with noise.31 In these models, the stochastic process takes
the form of an ergodic Markov chain. Ergodicity is obtained by introducing a
noise term, which makes every state reachable with some positive probability
within a finite time. In a biological context, this noise may be interpreted as a
mutation, i. e. a random alteration of the agentsí genetic code. In a learning
context, this noise can be interpreted as a mistake, i. e. a random alteration of
the agentsí behavior, or an effect of the playersí experimentation.
The formal steps to obtain a continuous-time deterministic dynamic starting
from a discrete-time stochastic process with noise involve approximation
techniques similar to those we already used in section 3. Consider I populations
of fixed size P whose members occasionally revise their strategy according to
some (unmodeled) learning process. Let us further assume that the expected
state of the system at time n + θ , given that the state at time n  is r(n) = r  can be
written as follows:
E r(n + θ) r[ ]= F(r) + λG(r). (5.1)
To interpret (5.1), we can think of F  as the selection dynamics and G  as the
noise term. Samuelson (1997: p. 172). justifies the presence of this perturbation
on the ground that: ì...like any model, the selection process is an approximation,
                                          
31See, for example, Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993). Vega Redondo (1996) provides
a comprehensive survey on this research field.
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designed to capture the important features of a problem, while excluding other
considerations...î.32 By analogy with (3.3), if the derivatives of F  and G  are
Lipschitz continuous, we can take a Taylor expansion of (5.1) to obtain
E ∆r r[ ]= θ f (r) + λg(r)( )+ o(θ2 ) , (5.2)
where f  and g  are the derivatives of F  and G . Divide both sides by θ , taking
limits for P → ∞  and θ → 0, such that ∆r
θ
→ c > 0  as θ → 0 to get
Ý r (t) = f (r(t)) + λg(r( t)), (5.3)
that is, a ìperturbedî version of the dynamics (2.1), provided λ  (the drift level)
is sufficiently small.33
Gale et al. (1995) use a special case of (5.3) to study the evolutionary
properties of the Ultimatum Game. In this game Anna offers Beppe a share of
some fixed cake. If Beppe accepts the offer, then the pie is shared as agreed; if
Beppe rejects the offer, nobody gets anything. This game has a unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium in which Anna offers (an ε  more than) nothing
and Beppe accepts. The intuition is the same as in the Entry Game: if Anna
knows that Beppe is rational, she can rely on the fact that Beppe will accept
anything, no matter how little it is. In fact, there is a clear analogy between the
two games. If we restrict the possible offers to high or low, assuming that a high
offer is automatically accepted by Beppe, then the Ultimatum Game is
strategically equivalent to the Entry Game of Figure D.34
The Ultimatum Game is a game for which the backward induction hypothesis
is universally rejected by the experimental evidence, although the various
                                          
32See also Boylan (1995) and Seymour (1994) for a more detailed account of the
technicalities presented in this section.
33This reflects the fact that all the major forces governing the dynamics should be captured
by f . The terminology of drift (as opposed to noise) highlights the fact that the latter is a
random variable, whereas the former is a purely deterministic dynamic.
34This is why Gale et al. (1995) refer to the game of Figure D as the Ultimatum Minigame.
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experimental results provide no clear alternative hypothesis.35 To explain the
fundamental weaknesses of backward induction in the context of the Ultimatum
Game, Gale et al. (1995) propose the following dynamics:
Ý r i
k (t) = ri
k (t) ui k ,r− i( t)( )− ui r( t)( )( )+ λ i µ ik − rik ( t)( );λi ≥ 0,µ ik = 1K i . (5.4)
In Gale et al. (1995), the dynamic (5.4) is derived from a population game in
which agents die (or leave the game, or experiment new ways of playing) at a
fixed rate λ idt . Those who die are replaced by novices (or experimenters) who
play each strategy k  with equal probability 
1
Ki
, while the aggregate behavior of
the rest of the population follows the RD.
Figure F traces some trajectories of (5.4) for the Entry Game with different
drift levels.
FIGURE F
RD with drift and the Entry Game
Figure Fi) shows trajectories of the RD without drift that mimic the behavior
already shown in the phase diagram of Figure E. Figure Fii) shows trajectories
of (5.4) when both λ A  and λ B  are ìnegligibleî. In this case, the drift against
                                          
35A detailed accoun on the experimental evidence on the Ultimatum Game is provided by
Roth (1995).
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Beppeís weakly dominated strategy d is sufficient to push the system away from
NE. In Figure Fiii) λ B  is substantially higher than λ A . In this case, the system
(5.4) has two restpoints close to NE, one of which is asymptotically stable. In
other words, although the drift points toward the relative interior of the state
space, this may not be sufficient to destabilize the Nash equilibrium component
in which a suboptimal action is played with positive probability.
It is possible to show that this behavior is not specific of the drift
parametrization of Figure Fiii). To show this, we replicate Gale et al. (1995)
results fixing µB
C
≡ µ , λ A = λ B = λ  and letting λ → 0. In other words, we prove
that their conclusions are robust to a different specification of the drift term in
which we do not fix the mixed strategy µ  played by the mutants, but let the drift
level be arbitrarily small.
PROPOSITION 11. Let RE
^
(µ)  be the set of restpoints of (5.4) for λ  sufficiently
close to 0.
a) For all µ ∈(0,1) , RE
^
(µ)  contains the subgame-perfect equilibrium (D,c),
which is also asymptotically stable.
b) When µ  is sufficiently large, RE
^
(µ)  contains also two additional restpoints,
both belonging to 
  
NE , one of which is asymptotically stable.
PROOF. In the Appendix.
Similar considerations apply when we consider (an appropriate finite normal
form of) the full Ultimatum Game. In this case, Gale et al. (1995) show, with
the aid of simulations, how the dynamic (5.4) yields as constant prediction one
of the Nash equilibria in which Anna offers a positive share of the cake and
Beppe accepts. In other words, the system converges to an outcome in which
the first-mover advantage is not fully exploited by the proposer (and, therefore,
the subgame perfect prediction is violated).
34
As Binmore and Samuelson (1999) put it, in the Ultimatum Game drift
matters, as arbitrarily small perturbations yield dramatic changes in the dynamic
properties of the game. In particular, the existence of an asymptotically stable
equilibrium belonging to NE for a non-negligible set of admissible
perturbations weakens the subgame-perfect prediction. If initial conditions are
sufficiently close, Beppeís ìincredible threatî may be sustainable even in the
presence of perturbations.36
6. CONCLUSION
Although promising, the literature reviewed in this paper leaves many
questions unanswered, challenging the discipline with new puzzles. For
example, further theoretical work (as in Ritzberger and Weibull (1997)) is
needed on the convergence properties of evolutionary dynamics outside the
class of dominance solvable games. Similar considerations hold for the
literature on perturbed evolutionary dynamics, whose results (with the sole
exception of Binmore and Samuelson (1999)) still refer to specific classes of
games and dynamics.
Above all, now that a formal (although preliminary) microfoundation of these
dynamics has been established, its empirical relevance remains open to
discussion. That is, to which extent the behavioral models presented in section 3
are capable of solving the grand questions from which we started.
                                          
36See also Cabrales and Ponti (forthcoming) and Ponti (1998) for the evolutionary properties
of Nash equilibrium refinements, such as subgame-perfection or iterated deletion of weakly
dominated strategies, in the context of implementation theory.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 10. To prove the proposition, it is enough to show that
all interior trajectories converge. This is because, once convergence has been
proved, convergence to a Nash equilibrium follows directly from Proposition
1ii).
Fix a generic initial condition r 0( )∈∆0 . First note that Beppe has a weakly
dominated strategy (namely, d). Thus, by Proposition 9i),
ρBd (r(0),t)
ρB
c (r(0),t)
→ L B
(d,c) (r(0)) ≥ 0 as t →∞ . This already implies convergence of
ρB(r(0),t), since SB  contains only two strategies. Two alternatives need be
discussed:
i) L B
(d,c )(r(0)) ≥ 1 / 2 .That is, L B
(d,c )(r(0)) is at least as high as the threshold value for
ρBd (r(0), t)
ρB
c
(r(0), t)
 that makes Anna indifferent between her pure strategies C and B. This
implies D ≤τ C  (fix τ = 0  and CB = {x ∈[0,1] x ≥1 / 3}), which in turn implies, by
Proposition 9i), convergence of ρ(r(0), t) to a Nash equilibrium.37 More
precisely: if L B
(d,c )
(r(0)) ≥ 1 / 2 , then 
 
ρ(r(0), t)→ NE . This is because, by
Proposition 9ii), L B
(d,c )(r(0)) > 0  implies ρA
D (r(0),t) → 0 .
ii) L B
(d,c )(r(0)) < 1 / 2  (i.e. L B
(d,c )(r(0)) =1 / 2 − ε ). This implies C <τ D  (fix
τ = t ≥ 0 x =
1 − ε / 2
3
   
   and CB = {x ∈[0,1] x ≤
1 − ε / 2
3
}) and, by Proposition 8,
ρA
C (r(0),t)→ 0  (i.e. ρA
D (r(0), t) →1). This in turn implies d < τ c  (i.e. convergence to
the subgame-perfect equilibrium (D,c)).
Since this exhausts all cases, the result follows.
                                          
37D ≤τ C  also when L B
(d,c )
(r(0)) =1 / 2 . This is because, by weak dominance of d, 
ρBd (r(0), t)
ρB
c
(r(0), t)
is decreasing in t for all t > 0 . In consequence, uA (D,ρB (r(0), t)) < uA (C,ρB (r(0), t)) for all
t > 0 .
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 11. For the game of Figure D, the RD with drift is as
follows.
Ý y = y(1− y )(3x −1) + λ ( 1
2
− y), (A.1)
Ý x = x(1− x )(y −1) + λ µ − x( ). (A.2)
Denote by RE (Γ)  the set of restpoints of (A.1-2) when λ = 0 , that is, the set of
restpoints of the RD. It is straightforward to show that RE (Γ)  contains (together
with all the pure strategy profiles) only the component
RE 1 = (x ,y ) ∈∆ y =1,x ∈[0,1]{ }.
We know, from Binmore and Samuelson (1999), Proposition 1, that every
limiting rest point of (A.1-2) as λ → 0 must lie in RE(Γ). Only two cases need be
discussed.
CASE 0: λ → 0 and y → 0. This yields (0,0) and (1,0) as possible candidates for
the limit points in RE
^
(µ) . The first (second) point is (not) a limiting restpoint of
(A.1-2) since it is a sink (source) of the unperturbed dynamics. We also know,
from Binmore and Samuelson (1999), Proposition 2, that (0,0) must be
asymptotically stable, since it is a sink of the unperturbed dynamics. This
completes part a) of the proof.
CASE 1: λ → 0 and y →1. Setting Ýy =0 in (A.1) yields the following:
1 − y
λ  =
y −1/ 2
y(3x −1)
. (A.3)
Denote by x1 a limiting value for x in a rest point, if a limit exists, when y →1. It
must be
lim
y→1
λ →0
1 − y
λ =
1
2(3x0 −1)
(A.4)
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Setting 
Ý x 
λ =0, substituting 
(1− y)
λ  with the right hand side of (A.3) and taking
limits leads to the following solutions for x1 :
!!
"!
x 1 =
1 + 6µ + 1− 28µ + 36µ 2
10
and 
!
#!
x 1 =
1 + 6µ − 1− 28µ + 36µ 2
10
.
We know from (A.2) that x1 must be a real, positive number, with 1 / 3 < x1 < µ .
For the expression under the square root of the numerator to be nonnegative, it
must be µ ∈[(7+ 2 10) / 18,1]. To study the stability properties of !!
"!
x 1  and !!
#!
x 1  we
look at he Jacobian matrix for the dynamic (A.1-2):
J(x,y,λ ) =
(3x −1)(1− 2y) − λ 3y(1− y )
x(1 − x) (1− 2x )(y −1) − λ .
We evaluate trace and determinant of J(x,y,λ ) , factorizing for λ and
substituting λ, y , (1− y)λ  with their limiting values. The limiting trace of J(x,y,λ )
equals to 1 − 3x1, which is negative for all feasible x1 . The sign of the limiting
determinant of J(x,y,λ )  coincides with the sign of the following expression:
ψ (x1 ) = (3x1 −1)(1 − 2x1 ) + 2(3x1 −1)2 − 3x1(1 − x1) , (A.5)
which is positive only in the feasible domain of !
"!
x 1 . In consequence, !
"!
x 1  is
asymptotically stable whereas !!
#!
x 1  is not. This completes part b) of the proof.ð
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